from substack https://reframingamerica.substack.com/p/inflation-and-the-association-game/
she is in the style of George Lafoff and works from the frame of Cognitive Metaphor Theory.
She has an identity on FB https://www.facebook.com/groups/426400367403954/user/680857773
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/cogs.12320
Cognitive Science 40 (2016) 881–908Copyright©2015 Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights reserved.ISSN: 0364-0213 print / 1551-6709 onlineDOI: 10.1111/cogs.12320Cognitive Metaphor Theory and the Metaphysics ofImmediacyMathias W. MadsenInstitute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of AmsterdamReceived 6 October 2014; received in revised form 2 April 2015; accepted 7 April 2015AbstractOne of the core tenets of cognitive metaphor theory is the claim that metaphors ground abstractknowledge in concrete, first-hand experience. In this paper, I argue that this grounding hypothesiscontains some problematic conceptual ambiguities and, under many reasonable interpretations,empirical difficulties. I present evidence that there are foundational obstacles to defining a coher-ent and cognitively valid concept of “metaphor” and “concrete meaning,” and some general prob-lems with singling out certain domains of experience as more immediate than others. I concludefrom these considerations that whatever the facts are about the comprehension of individual meta-phors, the available evidence is incompatible with the notion of an underlying conceptual structureorganized according to the immediacy of experience.Keywords:Cognitive metaphor theory; Psycholinguistics; Primary metaphor; Analogy; Lexicalsemantics
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230286825_3
3
Conceptual Metaphor Theory∗
In a radical departure from theories based on digital, amodal accounts
of cognition and language, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) proposed an
account of metaphor as fundamentally conceptual, arguing that familiar
linguistic metaphors are but surface manifestations of underlying
conceptual relationships. They claimed that most conceptual thought is
metaphorical, and conceptual domains are instantiated and expressed
in families of conceptual metaphors, such as ‘MORE IS UP’, ‘EMOTION-
ALLY INTIMATE IS PHYSICALLY CLOSE’, ‘ARGUMENT IS WAR’, ‘LOVE IS
A JOURNEY’, and ‘THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS’. These conceptual meta-
phors number in the hundreds (Gibbs, 1994b; Lakoff and Johnson,
1999), and they combine to serve as the foundation for new metaphors.
For many of these families of metaphors Lakoff and Johnson trace the
underlying metaphor to a literal concept based on embodied physical
experience.
In the first part of this chapter, I will present a brief sketch of concep-
tual metaphor theory, beginning with the original insights (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980) and finishing with a summary of some of the exten-
sions to the theory that have been more recently proposed (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1999). I will then review some of the principle criticisms of
conceptual metaphor theory.